Types[ edit ] Vital signs defining the colour-coded triage. Glasgow Coma Score; Tp: Abnormal vital signs are strong predictors for intensive care unit admission and in-hospital mortality in adults triaged in the emergency department.
Wheelonphysicist and developer of Central Intelligence Agency 's aerial surveillance program Charles E. Yeagerretired Air Force general and the first person to break the sound barrier in level flight Findings[ edit ] The Space Shuttle solid rocket booster field joint assembly from the Rogers Commission report The commission found that the Challenger accident was caused by a failure in the O-rings sealing the aft field joint on the right solid rocket booster, causing pressurized hot gases and eventually flame to "blow by" the O-ring and contact the adjacent external tank, causing structural failure.
The failure of the O-rings was attributed to a design flaw, as their performance could be too easily compromised by factors including the low temperature on the day of launch.
Most salient was the failure of both NASA and its contractor, Morton Thiokolto respond adequately to the design flaw. The Commission found that as early asNASA managers had not only known about the flawed O-ring, but that it had the potential for catastrophe. This led the Rogers Commission to conclude that the Challenger disaster was "an accident rooted in history".
There was a meeting the night before the launch to discuss any major pressing issues that might delay the launch further. This was done in large part because of the management structure at NASA and the lack of major checks and balances, which proved to be fatal in this scenario.
It stays the same dimension. In other words, for a few seconds at least and more seconds than that, there is no resilience in this particular material when it is at a temperature of 32 degrees. His style of investigating with his own direct methods rather than following the commission schedule put him at odds with Rogers, who once commented, "Feynman is becoming a real pain.
His interviews of NASA's high-ranking managers revealed startling misunderstandings of elementary concepts. One such concept was the determination of a safety factor. These O-rings provided the gas-tight seal needed between the vertically stacked cylindrical sections that made up the solid fuel booster.
NASA managers recorded this result as demonstrating that the Prioritizing english over the loss of had a "safety factor" of 3. Feynman incredulously explains the magnitude of this error: To paraphrase Feynman's example, if engineers built a bridge that could bear 3, pounds without any damage, even though it was never expected to bear more than 1, pounds in practice, the safety factor would be 3.
If a 1, pound truck drove across the bridge and it cracked at all, even just a third of the way through a beam, the safety factor is now zero: Feynman continued to investigate the lack of communication between NASA's management and its engineers, and was struck by management's claim that the risk of catastrophic malfunction on the shuttle was 1 in ; i.
Feynman immediately realized that this claim was risible on its face; as he described, this assessment of risk would entail that NASA could expect to launch a shuttle every day for the next years while suffering, on average, only one accident.
Investigating the claim further, Feynman discovered that the 1 in figure was stating what they claimed that the failure rate ought to be, given that it was a manned vehicle, and working backwards to generate the failure rate of components.
First, NASA management assigned a probability of failure to each individual bolt, sometimes claiming a probability of 1 in ; that is, one in one hundred million. Feynman pointed out that it is impossible to calculate such a remote possibility with any scientific rigor.
Secondly, Feynman was bothered not just by this sloppy science but by the fact that NASA claimed that the risk of catastrophic failure was "necessarily" 1 in As the figure itself was beyond belief, Feynman questioned exactly what "necessarily" meant in this context—did it mean that the figure followed logically from other calculations, or did it reflect NASA management's desire to make the numbers fit?
He then decided to poll the engineers themselves, asking them to write down an anonymous estimate of the odds of shuttle explosion.
Feynman found that the bulk of the engineers' estimates fell between 1 in 50 and 1 in Not only did this confirm that NASA management had clearly failed to communicate with their own engineers, but the disparity engaged Feynman's emotions.
When describing these wildly differing estimates, Feynman briefly lapses from his damaging but dispassionate detailing of NASA's flaws to recognize the moral failing that resulted from a scientific failing: The O-rings were rubber rings designed to form a seal in the shuttle's solid rocket boosters, preventing the rockets' hot gas from escaping and damaging other parts of the vehicle.
Feynman suspected that despite NASA's claims, the O-rings were unsuitable at low temperatures and lost their resilience when cold, thus failing to maintain a tight seal when rocket pressure distorted the structure of the solid fuel booster.
Feynman's suspicions were corroborated by General Kutynaalso on the commission, who cunningly  provided Feynman with a broad hint by asking about the effect of cold on O-ring seals after mentioning that the temperature on the day of the launch was far lower than had been the case with previous launches: Inthe BBC film The Challenger revealed that the O-Ring insight had in fact come to Kutyna from the astronaut and fellow commission member Sally Ridewho had secretly provided him with NASA test results showing the O-rings became stiff when they were too cold.
He found similar failures in procedure in many other areas at NASA, but singled out its software development for praise due to its rigorous and highly effective quality control procedures — then under threat from NASA management, which wished to reduce testing to save money given that the tests had always been passed.
Feynman soon found that, while he respected the intellects of his fellow Commission members, they universally finished their criticisms of NASA with clear affirmations that the Challenger disaster should be addressed by NASA internally, but that there was no need for NASA to suspend its operations or to receive less funding.
Feynman felt that the Commission's conclusions misrepresented its findings, and he could not in good conscience recommend that such a deeply flawed organization as NASA should continue without a suspension of operations and a major overhaul.
His fellow commission members were alarmed by Feynman's dissent, and it was only after much petitioning that Feynman's minority report was included at all. Feynman was so critical of flaws in NASA's "safety culture" that he threatened to remove his name from the report unless it included his personal observations on the reliability of the shuttle, which appeared as Appendix F.
It appears that there are enormous differences of opinion as to the probability of a failure with loss of vehicle and of human life.
The estimates range from roughly 1 in to 1 in ,The Rogers Commission Report was created by a Presidential Commission charged with investigating the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster during its 10th mission, urbanagricultureinitiative.com report, released and submitted to President Ronald Reagan on 9 June , both determined the cause of the disaster that took place 73 seconds after liftoff, and urged NASA to improve and install new safety features on the.
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